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n 5 January 2007, Elspeth Guild was 
invited by the European Commission Select 
Committee of the UK House of Lords to 
submit written evidence to assist that body in its 
scrutiny of the European Commission’s annual 
legislative and work programme. This Policy Brief 
reproduces her submission in full. 
Introductory remarks 
It is both an honour and a pleasure to submit 
comments to this inquiry into the Commission’s 
Communication on the legislative and work 
programme 2007. It is vital that the work of the 
Commission is subject to oversight by the European 
Parliament and national parliaments in order to 
ensure proper democratic participation in the 
priorities and legislative programme of the 
Commission. In our view, the inquiries carried out 
by the House of Lords Committee on these issues 
are of fundamental importance to the operation of 
the EU. We would encourage other national 
parliaments to take the same active interest in 
carrying out scrutiny of activity by the Commission 
and other EU level actors to ensure that democratic 
voices from across the Union are heard. 
This submission addresses six areas of the Work 
Programme 2007 which are related to our work in 
the area of freedom, security and justice: 1) the ‘big 
agendas’, 2) strategic objectives regarding security, 
3) the EU’s voice in the world, 4) managing 
migration flows, 5) managing the acquis and 6) 
connecting Europe to its citizens. We will not 
comment on proposals in fields beyond this sphere 
except to the extent that they have consequences for 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
1. The big agendas: Globalisation and 
the citizen’s agenda 
There are two important strategic policy agendas set 
out in the Commission’s Legislative and Work 
Programme: the EU’s response and participation in 
globalisation and the citizen’s agenda. We would 
take this opportunity to make some preliminary 
comments on how action in the AFSJ should 
complement and not hinder these two objectives. 
First, regarding globalisation, if we take this term to 
mean the integration of economies at the 
international level in pursuit of prosperity and 
development, regard should be had to how the EU 
has successfully managed the integration of 
economies. Concerning the AFSJ, key to the success 
of the EU’s internal market has been the steadfast 
commitment to free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital. The engagement of people in 
the success of economic development and market 
integration was recognised from the start of the 
European integration project and the principle of 
free movement of persons was maintained, not 
without resistance from some interior ministries, as a 
core objective until it has become a reality. It is not 
realistic to seek the benefits of globalisation if 
people are excluded from the overall European 
project. If people cannot travel to find new markets 
for their goods or challenging job opportunities, 
provide services or source their product needs, 
globalisation cannot and will not fully benefit the 
society. People make globalisation happen whether 
they are entrepreneurs, employees, students, tourists 
or family members. Without contact between 
people, economic activities will not grow across 
borders.  
Thus, in order to participate in and benefit from 
globalisation, the EU must pursue policies and 
regulations regarding border management, economic 
migration and access to the EU for third-country 
nationals which enhance rather than hinder 
movement of persons. Closed EU borders for 
persons sit uneasily with the globalisation 
objectives, which seek to maximise the benefits of 
movement of goods, services and capital. If the 
citizen’s agenda is aimed at providing employment 
and stability within the Union through participation 
in globalisation creating new markets for goods and 
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services, citizens must be able to move freely to 
third countries to seek markets and not be hindered 
by reciprocal restrictions in third countries which 
governments often impose because the EU 
regulatory framework excludes or creates substantial 
obstacles for their nationals to have access to the EU 
territory. 
For the effective delivery of a citizen’s agenda, 
‘more Europe’ through the expansion of ‘the 
Community method’ to all the AFSJ areas is highly 
desirable. Without a substantial change in the 
current institutional mechanisms characterising 
European cooperation within the context of an AFSJ 
and the abolition of the current pillar structure, the 
AFSJ is not going to succeed in the eyes of the 
people. The European project in this dimension 
needs to move from the deficiencies inherent to the 
intergovernmental method of European cooperation, 
inside or outside the legal structures provided by the 
Third Pillar (Treaty on European Union) to a rooted 
Community method. This will be the only way to 
duly offer a solid democratic framing of a European 
Space where liberty, security and justice of the 
individual are fully guaranteed.
1 
2. Strategic objectives as regards 
security 
Based on the foundations provided by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Tampere European Council 
of October 1999 gave political direction for the 
gradual development of an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice.
2 The Tampere Programme 
identified the creation of an AFSJ as a fundamental 
priority for the future of the European Union and set 
out the objectives for its first five years ending in 
2004. The ‘Hague Programme’ agreed by the 
Council on November 2004 adopted a new five-year 
policy agenda in these areas.
3 So far, the level of 
policy convergence
4 reached in the dimensions of 
                                                 
1 S. Carrera and E. Guild, The Hague Programme and 
the EU’s Agenda on Freedom, Security and Justice: 
Delivering Results for Europe’s Citizens?, CEPS 
Commentary, 10 July 2006 (retrievable from 
www.ceps.be). 
2 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European 
Council, 15-16 October 1999, SN 200/99, Brussels. 
3 European Council, The Hague Programme: 
Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, 2005/C53/01, OJ C53/1, 3.3.2005. 
4 By policy convergence we mean not only the degree 
of harmonisation or level of ‘Europeanisation’ based 
on the number of legal instruments that have been 
adopted at the EU level, but also to the discretion left 
to member states in the application of a wide range of 
provisions incorporated in the EU laws examined.  
‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ is incomplete.
5 In 
general terms, the expected level of harmonisation, 
or Europeanisation, in some fields has not been 
successfully reached. Further, an in-depth 
examination of the provisions included in the EU’s 
legislative instruments reveals surprisingly low 
minimum standards, which may endanger 
international and European human rights 
commitments. They also offer a wide discretion for 
member states to apply national law and substantial 
exceptions to the common rules which permit both 
wide practical divergence and dispersion in the 
national arena.
6 
A major deficit of the Hague Programme is the way 
in which ‘freedom’ and ‘security’ are presented as 
antithetical values, and therefore requiring a 
balanced approach between the two. This balancing 
metaphor mainly consists of the need to find the 
right equilibrium between freedom and security in 
the EU. In fact, its predecessor, the Tampere 
Programme, rejected this understanding of the 
relationship between freedom and security by 
advocating a “shared commitment to freedom based 
on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule 
of law” as the starting paradigm.
7 Securing the rule 
of law needs to reside at the heart of the European 
integration project. The Hague Programme appears 
to marginalise the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms (liberty), the principle of equality and 
of democratic accountability and judicial control. 
The overall priority guiding the Programme remains 
clear: strengthening security understood as 
coercion.
8 The direct result is that the EU policy and 
regulatory framework do not offer the necessary 
mechanisms and venues for the creation of an AFSJ 
based on the liberty and equality. 
3. The EU’s voice in the world 
One of the key objectives of the Work Programme is 
to promote the voice of the EU in the world to match 
its economic weight. This is a very laudable 
                                                 
5 T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (2006), Security versus 
Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Ashgate: 
Hampshire. 
6 T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (2005), Migration, Borders 
and Asylum: Trends and Vulnerabilities in the EU, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
7, A Response to the Hague Programme: Protecting the 
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights in the Next Five 
Years of an EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
CHALLENGE Paper (retrievable from 
www.libertysecurity.org). 
8 D. Bigo, “Liberty, Whose Liberty? The Hague 
Programme and the Concept of Freedom”, in T. 
Balzacq and S. Carrera, Security versus Freedom: A 
Challenge for Europe’s Future?, Hampshire: Ashgate, 
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objective, but again we would note that policies that 
have been adopted in the AFSJ field are already 
having a negative impact on the ability of the world 
to hear the EU’s voice. There have been numerous 
occasions when, over the past twelve months, we 
have spoken with colleagues organising conferences 
on economic and other relevant policy issues both at 
the level of experts, decision-makers, academics and 
researchers who have expressed extreme frustration 
at the refusal of various EU consulates to issue visas 
to experts, academics, policy-makers, 
representatives of NGOs and others so that they 
could come to the EU to participate in discussions. 
Among the most irritating of results is when an EU 
consulate appears, deliberately, to delay issuing the 
visa until the conference or other event has already 
taken place thus rendering impossible the arrival of 
the guest to participate while at the same time 
avoiding the accusation of having refused the visa. 
The EU´s voice cannot be heard under such 
circumstances except by EU citizens and nationals 
of countries on the EU visa white list. But most of 
the new markets for the EU and the potential new 
sources of energy are in countries on the visa black 
list. If their nationals are negatively treated by the 
current visa processing system of some EU member 
states and effectively prevented (in practice because 
of delayed visas rather than in law by refused visas) 
from coming to the EU to participate in discussions, 
the EU’s voice will not be heard – or if it is, then by 
people who are already ill-disposed to the EU. A 
radical shake-up of the EU visa black list would be 
the most desirable development to remove countries 
from this list. Alternatively or additionally, a 
massive extension of visa exemption schemes for 
researchers, academics, policy-makers and NGO 
representatives irrespective of their country of 
nationality, would be most desirable and highly 
efficient. The extension of the visa facilitation 
agreements already in place with Russia and 
Moldova are also a weaker but still desirable option. 
4. Managing migration flows 
One of the objectives of the work programme is to 
better manage migration flows. It proposes the 
development of schemes for economic immigrants 
with particular focus on highly skilled migrants. 
These are laudable aims, but it will be critical to 
ensure that, in their pursuit, other policy objectives 
are not frustrated. The first fact to be recognised is 
that the more complex economic migration laws 
become (and there has been a tendency in many 
member states to adopt new rules on economic 
migration with a bewildering frequency), the more 
people will pass from a regular status to one of 
irregularity. The more documents one must provide 
and the more quickly the rules are changed, the 
fewer people will be able to provide everything 
required or to react within the limited time scales 
and so their status on the territory passes from legal 
to illegal without any substantive change in their 
activities or lives.  
Among the more pernicious of policies that have the 
effect of transforming a person lawfully present into 
an ‘illegal immigrant’ is the prohibition on 
switching from one immigration category to another 
without leaving the country, going back to the 
country of origin and obtaining a visa for the new 
purpose in the country of origin. So, for instance, 
where a foreign student marries an EU permanent 
resident, Directive 86/2003 requires that the student 
return to the country of origin and wait for what may 
be years, to obtain a visa to return as a spouse. If the 
student just continues to remain in the state as a 
student, he or she may later have obstacles placed in 
the way of changing status because of the delay in 
applying. These kinds of rules foster irregularity and 
impede regularity. Any new rules at the EU level in 
this area must avoid such pitfalls.  
Furthermore, a ‘secure legal status’ needs to be 
granted not only to those immigrant workers 
labelled by the national law at hand as ‘highly 
skilled’ or ‘talented’. The establishment of a 
European legal framework offering juridical 
protection to those third-country nationals falling 
within the category of high-skilled economic 
immigrants involves the emergence of 
discrimination towards all ‘the others’ not falling 
within this privileged status. Legal security must be 
offered also to all the rest of immigrant workers in 
order to avoid exploitation, discrimination and 
insecurity in the dimension of labour immigration in 
the EU. In addition, the Commission proposes 
legislation on penalties for employers of persons 
irregularly on the territory. In light of the above 
comments, it may not be sensible to introduce 
penalties in this field before there is clarity for 
employers on legality of residence and employment 
of third-country nationals in the EU. 
As highlighted by the Policy Plan on Legal 
Migration COM(2005)669 of December 2005, The 
Commission needs to promote the establishment of a 
European framework providing transnational 
European protection of the rights of immigrants who 
are in legal employment and have already been 
admitted to EU territory. Additionally, the rights and 
liberties contained in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms need to be applied fully to all 
persons residing inside the EU’s territory. 
Residence, and not nationality, is the linking factor 
for having access to the EU’s set of freedoms.  
We have noted with increasing unease the lack of 
support which the UNHCR has given to EU 
measures on asylum. Clearly there is something 
wrong with the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS), if the international institution created to be 
the guardian of the Refugee Convention finds EU 4 | Elspeth Guild 
measures inadequate to fulfil the minimum 
obligations of the member states to the protection of 
refugees. In our opinion, the EU institutions 
(Commission, Council and the European Parliament) 
should defer to UNHCR regarding the correct 
interpretation of the Geneva Convention and ensure 
that all legislation adopted at the EU level complies 
with the internationally accepted interpretation of 
member states’ obligations to protect those fleeing 
persecution. It is a very bad example to the rest of 
the world that 27 of the world’s richest and most 
powerful countries refuse to comply with the 
internationally negotiated and accepted standards of 
refugee protection (in the negotiation of which they, 
themselves, have been highly present and vocal). 
The second phase of the CEAS should provide an 
opportunity to correct this error.
9 
5. Managing the EU acquis 
The Commission states that it is preparing an 
announcement on better regulation to ensure the 
correct application of EC law in the member states. 
We would take this opportunity to note that while 
the application of EC law is of great importance, 
there is an even more pressing problem about 
application of EU measures adopted in the Third 
Pillar. The European Arrest Warrant provides only 
one particularly stark example where one member 
state is now completely outside the system (Poland 
as a result of the decision of its constitutional court 
at the beginning of the year and the failure of the 
government to take the measures proposed to 
resolve the problem) and highly problematic 
implementation in a number of other member states 
whose deficiencies have been charted by the 
Commission. The Commission’s lack of power to 
ensure correct implementation of Third Pillar 
measures needs to be resolved quickly before the 
whole field falls into disrepute as an area of non-
approximation in which any practices preferred at 
the national level, irrespective of how problematic 











                                                 
9 See M. Garlick (2006), “Asylum Legislation in the 
European Community and the 1951 Convention: Key 
Concerns regarding Asylum Instruments Adopted in 
the ‘First Phase’ of Harmonisation”, in T. Balzacq and 
S. Carrera (eds), Security versus Freedom: A 
Challenge for Europe’s Future?, Hampshire: Ashgate. 
6. Connecting Europe to its citizens 
The Commission states that one of its fundamental 
objectives is to make EU policies understandable 
and relevant to the citizens. In particular, it wants to 
foster dialogue and debate with citizens, particularly 
including women and young people. 
Communication is one of the strategic objectives. 
We consider this to be a most laudable objective – 
communication with citizens is central to the 
legitimacy of the EU project. We are concerned, 
however, about the impact of some developments in 
the AFSJ on fostering this communication. A battery 
of measures have been announced in the First and 
Third Pillars, related to the Schengen Information 
System and other measures, which are aimed at a 
substantial increase in surveillance of the citizen, his 
or her movements, statements, actions and activities. 
At the same time, the protection of the citizen from 
wrongful use of his or her personal data has lagged 
very substantially behind – for instance, the 
continuing blockage of the Third Pillar Framework 
Decision on data protection.  
Without confidence regarding how data and 
communication will be used, it is useless to ask the 
citizen to engage in dialogue with the EU. Too often 
in the recent history of many member states, 
criticism of state policies or actions has been passed 
to security services and resulted in the blighting of 
the lives of citizens. If the Commission wants to 
communicate with the citizen and for the citizen 
honestly to engage with EU law and policy, it must 
convince the citizen that his or her data, opinions, 
activities and positions are protected against 
improper use.  
A reassessment of all EU policies on the creation, 
maintenance, access, distribution, correction and 
deletion of personal data is urgently needed. Priority 
should be given to the pressing need to foster 
confidence among citizens that their data are well 
and fully protected and are not being stored and 
passed to intelligence services and the like for 
subsequent use against them on the basis of the 
expression of their opinions and views. 
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